INTRODUCTION
Individuals with disabilities have long faced substantial barriers in the job market. Although a large majority of Americans with disabilities would like to havejobs, two-thirds of disabled individuals between the ages of sixteen and sixty-four are unable to find employment. 1 This discrepancy results not so much from active hostility on the part of the nondisabled population as it does from deeply ingrained, often unconscious assumptions about the limits imposed by disability. Simple neglect and, to a certain extent, fear of individuals who are different also contribute to this discrepancy. 2 Individuals with disabilities also suffer from a lack of educational opportunities available to them, which further limits their employment opportunities.
3
Although education of individuals with disabilities has improved in recent years, education of the general public about disabilities has not. As a result, the barriers of myth and ignorance that make employers reluctant to hire individuals with disabilities remain in place.
The consequences are substantial economic hardship and a disproportionate dependence on government aid. 4 The inability to find work also extracts a high personal cost. In a society that largely defines people by their occupations, refusing to hire individuals or relegating them to entrylevel jobs on the basis of their disabilities makes a social statement that these individuals are considered less than fully human.
Second, the regulations refined the definition of discrimination against the handicapped, including as discrimination failure to make reasonable accommodation to the known limitations imposed by an individual's handicap, unless making such accommodation would cause the employer undue hardship." The Rehabilitation Act represented a significant advance for individuals with disabilities. Nevertheless, three aspects of the Act limited its ability to open. the doors to employment for large numbers of individuals with disabilities. First, the broad language of the Act and the relatively limited legislative history for its employment provisions, especially section 504, left unclear the precise nature of the burden Congress intended to impose. Section 504, in particular, was open-ended; its provisions applied not merely to employment, but to all aspects of the programs run by recipients of federal funds. It therefore failed to take into account concerns Although Congress clearly relied upon the regulations implemented under the Rehabilitation Act in drafting the ADA, 20 the ADA's statutory language and extensive legislative history suggest that Congress intended to mnodify the Rehabilitation Act's approach to employment discrimination in subtle but significant ways. This Comment will argue that if the courts are to take seriously Congress's expressed intent to provide equal employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities, the courts must not apply Rehabilitation Act precedent to the ADA uncritically, but instead must recognize the ways in which Congress's expressed intent differs from the approach taken by the courts under section 501, and especially section 504, of the Rehabilitation Act. This Comment focuses on the ADA's duty of reasonable accommodation, since that requirement most sharply differentiates discrimination on the basis of disability from other forms of employment discrimination that are covered by Title VII or other statutes. Part I examines the meaning of nondiscrimination against individuals with disabilities, distinguishing the approach that Congress has adopted in the ADA from both the approach taken in Title VII and affirmative action. It then analyzes the approaches to reasonable accommodation taken by the courts under sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It argues that, although the courts have assumed that section 501 imposes a more substantial burden than does section 504, the fundamental approach to reasonable accommodation under both sections has been the same. Therefore, courts interpreting the ADA should look to both sections 501 and 504 for guidance in determining the extent of the duty of reasonable accommodation. Part II analyzes the substantive content of the ADA's definitions of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, and proposes a yardstick against which courts may measure an employer 's proposed 1991] REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA 1427 accommodation or claim of hardship. Part JII examines the procedures that employers should follow in determining whether reasonable accommodation is possible and concludes that the ADA is intended to impose a procedural duty, as well as a substantive duty, on employers covered by the Act.
I. THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION IN THE AMERICANS wrr-DISABILITIES ACT

A. The Meaning of Nondiscrimination Against Individuals with Disabilities
Although individuals with disabilities have long faced discrimination in the workplace, they are not protected by Title VII. 21 During the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were proposals to bring discrimination on the basis of disability under the umbrella of Title VH.
2 2 These proposals were ultimately rejected, however, in favor of an approach that addresses the unique difficulties faced by individuals with disabilities. Although much of the language of the ADA is superficially similar to that of Title VII, the similarities mask a conceptual shift in the meaning of discrimination and the means to remedy it. If courts are to apply the ADA consistently with Congress's intent, they must appreciate the difference between discrimination on the basis of disability and other forms of discrimination, as well as the different means that Congress has chosen to address that discrimination. To a certain extent, individuals with disabilities face the same disparate treatment and disparate impact barriers that confront the groups protected by Title VII. Discrimination on the basis of disability, like discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin, may be caused by social bias, an assumption or misconception about the protected group that is in no way related to that group's ability to perform. 997, 1001 (1984) . Social bias need not take the form of active hostility, but may appear as ignorance, indifference, and misconceptions about the abilities of the protected group. See ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 2, at 24-25. In either case, however, the result would be defined under Title VII as impermissible prohibiting employment discrimination against individuals with disabilities should eliminate this kind of disparate treatment, prohibiting employers from making decisions on the basis of social bias. Likewise, facially neutral elements may have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities. 24 For example, a written test for a position that requires neither reading nor writing will have a disparate impact on persons with dyslexia, for reasons completely unrelated to their ability to accomplish the tasks required by the job. 25 As construed by the Supreme Court, Title VII provides a remedy whenever facially neutral employment criteria have a disparate impact on an employer's workforce, 26 unless the "challenged practice [s] serve[], in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." 27 A law prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities could be modeled on this Title VII standard, thus forbidding the use of standards and criteria that have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities, unless these criteria can be justified by business necessity.
A law that went this far and no further, however, would only partially address the significant barriers to employment faced by individuals with disabilities. Unlike race, sex, religion, or national origin, which are rarely if ever relevant to an individual's ability to perform a given job, 28 a disability may indeed be directly relevant to an individual's capabilities. 29 2 There may well be a legitimate connection between an individual's disability and her ability to perform ajob; an employment criterion that has a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities is far more likely to meet the business necessity standard than would be the case under a Title VII claim.
To take this reality into account, while preserving protection for individuals with disabilities from unnecessary barriers to employment, the ADA modifies the Title VII definition of discrimination. While the goal of the ADA, like Title VII, is to provide not merely equal treatment or equal impact, but equal opportunity, the means of reaching this goal is different.
3 3 The ADA seeks to reconcile the fact that disability may genuinely render an individual incapable of performing ajob with the fact that disability is frequently not as significant an obstacle as it may first appear. An individual with a disability is not necessarily unable to perform ajob merely because of her disability. She may, however, be forced by her disability to perform the job in an unconventional manner. 3 4 Thus, a hearingimpaired individual whose job requires communication on the telephone may not be able to use a standard telephone, but may function well using a TTY keyboard designed for the hearing [Vol. 139:1423 impaired. The workplace, however, is structured to facilitate performance by nondisabled workers rather than workers with disabilities. The structure of the workplace, therefore, may stand as a barrier to the individual's employment.
35
This barrier superficially resembles a barrier that produces disparate impact under Title VII, and like a disparate impact barrier it may be removed by requiring the employer to modify its practices so as to eliminate the disparate impact. Because the difficulty lies in the structure of the employer's workplace, however, the prevention of discrimination of individuals with disabilities may require the employer to take remedial action above and beyond that typically required by Title VII. In enacting the ADA, Congress sought to resolve this difficulty through the concept of reasonable accommodation.
3 6 Under the ADA, as under the regulations implementing sections 501 and 504,37 if the employer could create an accommodation that allows the individual to perform the job and that does not impose an undue hardship, but refuses to do so, the employer's decision should be treated as discrimination on the basis of disability. 
B. Reasonable Accommodation vs. Affirmative Action
At first glance, the requirement of reasonable accommodation under the ADA resembles affirmative action, in that it requires the employer to take steps for the protected group that the employer does not take for nonprotected employees. Reasonable accommodation and affirmative action do stem from a common belief, namely that "in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently." 4 1 Despite their superficial similarity, however, the two concepts differ both in terms of theory and implementation. Affirmative action is remedial in character; it rests on a belief that groups that have been victims of discrimination require favorable treatment to overcome the effect of past wrongs. 42 Affirmative action involves more than merely allowing the members of a protected class to compete on equal terms with others; rather, it affords the protected class the advantage of different selection criteria with the explicit goal of increasing the participation of the protected class. 43 Thus, for example, an employer might engage in special recruiting efforts targeted at the protected group, might set a lower test score threshold for members of the group, or might set aside a certain number of positions for members of the group. 44 In any of these three instances, the individual's membership in the protected group serves as a "plus" that increases her chances of being hired; 45 implementation of the plan may result in the hiring of an individual who, according to the employer's standard evaluative criteria, is "less qualified" than other applicants. In contrast to affirmative action, reasonable accommodation is in theory not remedial. Instead of looking to overcome the effects of past discrimination, it focuses on overcoming present obstacles to employment. 46 Similarly, in practice, reasonable accommoda- Rather, it requires the employer to recognize the disabled individual's abilities and, if she would be able to meet the employer's standards in an unconventional manner, to make modifications that allow her to do so. If no accommodation would allow the individual to meet the employer's legitimate standards, or if the only sufficient accommodations would impose an undue hardship on the employer, then the employer is under no obligation to lower its standards or otherwise modify its program in order to hire the employee. 48 Moreover, when confronted with two equally qualified job applicants, only one of whom is disabled, the employer is under no obligation to select the applicant with a disability merely because of her disability. The fact that the Davis Court required the plaintiff to be able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite of her handicap, however, did not mean that no accommodation was necessary under section 504. The Court recognized that technology might assist (West Supp. 1991) . This situation creates obvious problems of proof: if the hearing-impaired applicant is not selected, how is the employee to disprove, or the employer to prove, that the decision represented a permissible choice between two qualified applicants rather than an impermissible refusal to offer reasonable accommodation? While burdens of proof are discussed infra notes 225-38 and accompanying text, the more difficult issue presented by this question is beyond the scope of this Comment.
53 442 U.S. 397 (1979) . 1434 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1423 some individuals with disabilities in overcoming the barriers they faced, and that such technology might be available at a cost that would not impose undue financial or administrative hardship.
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"Thus," the Court concluded, "situations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory." 5 8 In the Court's view, the facts before it did not present such a situation. The plaintiff suggested several possible accommodations that would have allowed her to participate in the nursing program, including constant close supervision during the clinical program and a curricular change to replace the clinical program with additional coursework. The Court rejected these, however, as requiring "substantial modifications" in the program, which would amount to a form of affirmative action not contemplated in section 504.
59
Although Davis discussed both accommodation and affirmative action, the Court's opinion was hardly a model of clarity, 60 and commentators sharply criticized the Court for failing to appreciate sufficiently the distinction between the two. 61 The Court responded to this criticism in its next case under section 504, Alexander v. Choate. 62 The Court narrowed its prior assertion that section 504 did not require affirmative action, by stating that section 504 did not require recipients of federal funds to make substantial modifica-57 See id. at 411 n.10.
58 Id. at 412-13. 59 See id. at 413. 60 The Court stated that the Rehabilitation Act distinguished between "evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons and affirmative efforts to overcome" disability, and that "Congress understood accommodation of the needs of handicapped individuals may require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it in those instances where it wished to do so." Id. at 410-11. This language strongly suggests that the Court equated accommodation with affirmative action. Yet later the Court acknowledged that failure to modify a program might be discriminatory. See id. at 412-13. Although the distinction between accommodation and affirmative action is present in the Court's analysis, the opinion suffers from imprecise terminology. There, the Court described an employer's duty under section 504 not as affirmative action, but as "an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee."
66
The distinction between reasonable accommodation and affirmative action may appear counterintuitive at first glance, and opponents of the ADA have criticized the reasonable accommodation requirement as a form of affirmative action. 67 The Supreme Court itself has recognized that the distinction between affirmative action and reasonable accommodation may not always be clear.
68
But the confusion that exists arises largely from a misapplication of concepts developed under Title VII to discrimination on the basis of disability. Whereas the nondiscrimination mandate under Tite VII may be implemented through equal treatment, the orientation of the workplace toward individuals who are not disabled means that mere equal treatment will leave in place substantial barriers to equal opportunity.
7 ' By including a reasonable accommodation requirement in the ADA, Congress has clearly stated its position that reasonable accommodation is not the equivalent of affirmative action, but rather is an integral part of the ADA's nondiscrimination mandate.
63 Id. at 300 n.20 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 410). If the courts apply Rehabilitation Act precedent uncritically, however, there is a substantial danger that they will understate the burdens that Congress intended to impose on employers in the ADA. The source of this difficulty is the text of the Rehabilitation Act itself. Section 504(a), which applies to recipients of federal funds, imposes a duty of nondiscrimination: it provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with handicaps
shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... T3 Section 501(b), in contrast, imposes a duty of affirmative action: it requires all executive departments and agencies to submit affirmative action plans containing "sufficient assurances, procedures and commitments to provide adequate hiring, placement, and advancement opportunities for individuals with handicaps."
74
Because of this distinction, the courts have consistently interpreted section 501 as imposing a more stringent requirement on federal employers than section 504 imposes on recipients of federal funds. 75 Because section 501 goes beyond both section 504's and the ADA's requirement of nondiscrimination to impose an affirmative action requirement on federal employers, 76 imposes a heavier burden of reasonable accommodation than does section 504, courts have in essence adopted the section 504 approach. 8 8 In short, despite their repeated invocations of section 501's affirmative action requirement, the courts have treated reasonable accommodation not as a form of affirmative action, but in a manner consistent with the nondiscrimination mandate of the ADA. Moreover, the courts have applied section 504 precedent to cases arising under section 501. This application of section 504 precedent is most notable in cases in which an employee with a disability is no longer able to perform her position and seeks a reassignment to which the employee would not be entitled under the employer's standard procedures. If the duty of reasonable accommodation under section 501 required the federal employer to make substantial modifications, or even merely to make accommodations above and beyond those required by section 504, then the courts could reasonably require reassignment to a position for which the employee was qualified, rather than permitting the employee's discharge. 89 Reassignment is, after all, an inexpensive accommodation. Moreover, if the federal employer is to be a "model employer" of individuals with disabilities as required in the regulations, 9 0 reassignment is certainly preferable to outright discharge and will maintain or increase the participation of individuals with disabilities in the federal workforce. Kathryn Tate agrees that the courts applying § 501 have limited federal employers' duties to reasonable accommodation using a standard substantially identical to that under § 504. See Tate, supra note 77, at 813, 819. Her argument, however, is that those courts must do what they profess to do. Because § 501 includes an affirmative action requirement, "courts must set the test for the mandated 'reasonable' accommodation under section 501 at a higher level of effort than that required under section 504." Id. at 801-02. This Comment argues that such an interpretation not only would create a hopeless muddle, in which reasonable accommodation could have three different meanings depending on the context in which it arose, but confuses the duty of reasonable accommodation, which arises under a mandate of nondiscrimination, with a duty of affirmative action, which goes beyond mere nondiscrimination. Because the ADA requires only nondiscrimination, not affirmative action, it is crucial to the consistent interpretation of the ADA that the distinction between reasonable accommodation and affirmative action be maintained. [
which involved only section 504, the courts have implicitly stated that, despite section 501's affirmative action requirement, the analysis of reasonable accommodation under section 501 and section 504 is identical. 94 Section 501 precedent concerning reasonable accommodation is relevant to the ADA because some courts have taken a grudging approach to reasonable accommodation under section 504, describing it as less than an affirmative duty. Indeed, a few courts have either failed to recognize the duty of reasonable accommodation at all under section 504,95 or have interpreted the section 504 standard applicable to nonfederal employers as requiring that the employer absorb only de 2ninimis cost. 9 6 Courts may have been reluctant to recognize a significant obligation of reasonable accommodation under section 504 because the language of the section does not mention reasonable accommodation, and the legislative history of section 504 gives little indication of Congress's intent as to the meaning and scope of nondiscrimination under section 504. 97 The ADA, in contrast, expressly contemplates reasonable accommodation for qualified individuals with disabilities, and Congress has made clear that the ADA is meant to impose a burden above and beyond de minimis cost. 98 Congress has also 92 In Arline, the Supreme Court stated that although employers "are not required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing policies. 
Essential Functions and Job Restructuring
Reasonable accommodation is the key concept of the employment provisions of the ADA, and it distinguishes the ADA from other areas of discrimination law. Given the concept's importance, it is perhaps strange that the statute does not define reasonable accommodation. Instead, it merely suggests possible accommodations, including physical modifications to make facilities accessible, job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment, modification of existing equipment or acquisition of new equipment, adjustments in examinations, training materials, and policies, and the provision of readers or interpreters. 1 0 0 Without an additional limiting factor, the duty to accommodate would be virtually boundless, limited only by the disabled individual's imagination. The ADA, however, provides two limiting factors. An employer need not accommodate an employee with a disability if doing so would cause the employer undue hardship. While stating that a reasonable accommodation must enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the job, the Act leaves open the question of what those functions are. In this respect, the Act confronts a fundamental tension. Congress did not intend to require employers to restructure their workforces substantially in order to accommodate employees with disabilities. 10 5 The employer must be left with a substantial amount of discretion to decide how best to allocate tasks among its workers. 10 6 On the other hand, Congress was unwilling to accept the employer's definition of the essential functions of a job as binding. 10 7 The ADA's duty of reasonable accommodation requires the employer to make affirmative efforts that may entail some expense. An unfortunate consequence of this duty is that the employer has an incentive to define the essential functions of a position in a manner that precludes an individual with a handicap from being able to perform them. Congress, however, also wanted to ensure that individuals with handicaps were not barred from the workplace by their inability to perform truly peripheral tasks. 
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REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA 1443 the level of a presumption. 1 0 9 Ultimately, therefore, the courts will have to determine what are the essential functions of a job. In making this determination consistently with legislative intent, a court should examine the following three factors. First, the court should determine whether all relevant employees actually perform the essential functions of the job as defined by the employer.
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If all employees are not required to perform a given task, then an employer who refuses to hire an applicant with a disability based on that individual's inability to perform the task is discriminating on the basis of handicap. Second, the court should look to the amount of time required by the task as a proportion of the employee's total work schedule.
11 1 If an employee spends a large percentage of her time on a given task, it is reasonable to assume that the task is an essential function of her job. The converse, however, is not necessarily true. The fact that an employee spends only a small amount of time on a task does not mean that the task is necessarily peripheral.
112 Third, to determine whether a task that occupies only a small proportion of an employee's time is essential, the court must examine the job not in isolation, but in the context of the overall work environment.
13
This takes into account the employer's interest in ensuring an optimal level of overall activity. Because the employer is presumed to know better than the court how best to reach this level of activity, the employer will not be required to reshape its entire organization in order to create ajob whose essential functions an individual with a disability is capable of performing. court refused to require the defendant post office to change his job structure entirely and adopt an assembly line operation that would allow the plaintiff to perform only those tasks within his capabilities. 118 In Treadwell v. Alexander, 11 9 the plaintiff, whose heart condition severely restricted his capacity for physical activity, applied to be a seasonal park technician with the Army Corps of Engineers. The plaintiff argued that he could perform the single task of fee collection, which, he said, occupied the majority of a seasonal park technician's time. The defendant, however, introduced convincing evidence that the plaintiff would be unable to perform the more physically arduous tasks of the job. 120 Because the few other employees at the site would not be able to accomplish both their own work and the work that the plaintiff was unable to do, the court concluded that allowing the plaintiff to do only those tasks within his abilities would not be a reasonable accommodation.
121
In contrast, the court in Davis v. Frank 122 reached a different result. In that case, a deaf postal worker sought promotion to the position of time and attendance clerk. Although the plaintiff was able to perform most of the duties of a time and attendance clerk, the defendant required the time and attendance clerk, together with three other employees, to answer incoming phone calls. The position also required, according to the defendant, the ability to hear conversational voice, with or without a hearing aid. 12 3 The court found that the job could be restructured to enable the plaintiff to perform its essential functions. The court reasoned that the job required not the ability to hear the conversational voice but the ability to exchange information, which, with the aid of minimal It further found that answering the phone was not central to the duties of a time and attendance clerk, and the court rejected the defendant's argument that requiring the other three employees to handle the phones would undermine their morale. 125 
Safety
Employers are legitimately concerned with the ability of their employees to function not only efficiently but also safely. To ensure that their employees do not create an unnecessary risk of harm to each other or to the public, many employers use safety-related screening devices designed to identify those applicants or employees who pose particular risks.
126 Although these screens may conceivably be implicated in any form of employment discrimination, they are particularly relevant to discrimination on the basis of disability. While virtually no screen that eliminated applicants on the basis of their race could be justified on the basis of safety, and only a very few such screens that selected applicants on the basis of sex or age could be so justified, 12 7 an individual's disability may be directly related to her ability to perform a job safely. 1 28 No one would argue that a transit authority should be required to hire blind bus drivers merely because the requirement that bus drivers be able to see has a disproportionate impact on the visually impaired. Yet precisely because disability may have a direct bearing on safety, it is vitally important to scrutinize safety-related screens carefully, to ensure that the screens distinguish among applicants on the basis of the genuine risk that they would create, and not on the basis of stereotypes and misconceptions about the disabilities that the individuals may possess. The courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act have struggled to balance the competing interests of employers, who are concerned with selecting a safe workforce at the lowest possible expense, and employees and applicants with disabilities, who desire to be judged on their own merits, rather than on the basis of assumptions about their disabilities. One court has upheld an employer's decision to discharge an employee on safety-related grounds by applying a rational basis test. In Doe v. Region 13 Mental 130 the Fifth Circuit said that as long as there was no evidence of discriminatory animus, it would give "reasonable deference" to the employer's conclusion that the employee posed a safety risk. 1 3 1 Although the Doe court did have a fair amount of evidence about the extent of the plaintiff's mental illness before it, the court's standard would appear to allow employers to base a decision not to hire or to discharge an individual with a disability on the statistical risks associated with that disability. The court's reasoning also suggested that only a low threshold of risk was necessary to support an adverse employment decision.
Other courts have held employers to a higher standard. First, they have required proof of a higher level of likelihood and substantiality of possible harm. In Strathie v. Department of Transportation, 1 3 2 the Third Circuit held that an employer may not set its safety standards so as to eliminate all risks of harm; rather, the employer may only seek to eliminate "appreciable risks."1 3 3
Allowing the employer to set its standards so as to eliminate all risks, even remote ones, would enable the employer to refuse to hire any individual who relied on a mechanical aid that might fail or be dislodged.
134
The Ninth Circuit set a still higher standard in 
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The Supreme Court also set a higher standard than the Doe court in School Board v. Arline, 1 3 7 stating that an employer need not hire an individual who posed a "significant risk" if that risk could not be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.
38
Second, the courts have required direct evidence, rather than inferential or speculative evidence, of a substantial risk. The Ninth Circuit in Mantolete required that the showing of likelihood of substantial harm be based not on the employer's speculations, or on statistical evidence related to the individual's disability, but rather on the individual's own work history and medical history. The ADA rejects the position espoused by the Fifth Circuit in Doe. It allows an employer to invoke safety concerns only when it can show that the individual with a disability poses "a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."
40
By requiring a direct threat, Congress intended to adopt the standard of Arline that the individual must pose a significant threat, not merely a remote or speculative threat.
14 1 A lesser standard, Congress reasoned, would allow employers to make decisions based on "generalizations, misperceptions, ignorance, irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or pernicious mythologies."
142 Moreover, by requiring that employment decisions be based on an individualized inquiry into the particular characteristics of the applicant, the ADA rejects the notion that an individual with a disability presents a significant risk simply because, on the whole, that disability is statistically associated with a significant risk. 14 3 The requirement of individualized inquiry is implicit in the notion that the individual must pose a "direct threat" of harm. The ADA further requires 136 Id. at 1422.
480 U.S. 273 (1987)
. 138 See id. at 287 n.16. 139 See Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1422-23. The court also held that an employer must "independently assess both the probability and severity of potential injury," which entails an analysis of the particular job the individual is seeking. [ Vol. 139:1423 that, if the employer determines that the individual will pose a significant risk, the employer consider whether any reasonable accommodation would lower the risk to an acceptable level.
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Finally, the ADA permits the employer to base an adverse decision on safety concerns only if the individual with a disability creates a direct threat to "other individuals." 14 5 The ADA does not allow a paternalistic employer to refuse to hire an applicant with a disability for what it perceives to be that applicant's own good; rather, the Act operates on the premise that an individual with a disability, when fully apprised of a potential risk and when the risk is only of future harm to herself, is capable of deciding for herself whether or not to submit to the risk.
B. Undue Hardship
Once the employer has determined that it can accommodate an employee or applicant with a disability-that is, that an accommodation will enable the individual to perform the essential functions of the job without endangering others-the employer must determine if implementing the proposed accommodation would cause undue hardship. The undue hardship standard was one of the most controversial elements of the ADA during its consideration in Congress. As originally introduced, the Act called for a very high standard: an accommodation would not be unreasonable unless it threatened the continued existence of the employer's business.
147
Faced with . rash of protests from the business community, Congress scaled back the burden in the final version of the Act. 148 A 1982 United States Department of Labor study suggested that employers' concerns about the excessive cost of accommodating individuals with disabilities were somewhat misplaced: it found that only 22% of disabled workers received any form of accommodation at all, and that for those requiring accommodation, 51% of the 146 See id. § 12101(a)(5) (citing "overprotective rules and policies" as an obstacle to be overcome); cf. Tucker, supra note 14, at 898-99 (arguing that under § 504 an employer should not be able to refuse to hire an individual with a disability on the basis of risk of future harm to that individual "unless it is virtually certain" that she would suffer permanent impairment as a result 
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149
To reduce this remaining burden on employers, Congress left in place a substantial duty to accommodate: an accommodation does not cause undue hardship unless it requires "significant difficulty or expense." 15 0
To assist in the determination of what constitutes an undue hardship, the ADA lists a number of factors that are to be considered. These factors relate to the cost of the proposed accommodation, the size, nature, and resources of the facility at which the accommodation is to be implemented, and the size, nature, and resources of the employing business entity as a whole. 151 The statute provides:
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include-(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise ofsuch accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. 1450 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 139:1423 undue hardship on a small business, or in a particular industry, may be reasonable for a large employer, or in a different industry. Undue hardship has been criticized-as a standard so vague as to amount to no standard at all. One commentator asserted that, in practice, undue hardship under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has not served as a principled limitation, but rather has been "a label for accommodations that courts have refused to require in particular cases." 154 There is some merit to this criticism. Congress has clearly marked the outer bounds of undue hardship: an undue hardship may be something less than a cost that would drive the employer to the verge of going out of business, but must impose more than a de minimis cost. Within these outer bounds, however, the courts have considerable room to maneuver.
Congress has provided some guidance in determining what constitutes undue hardship, and several additional factors can be adduced from the factors described in legislative history. First, in determining whether a particular accommodation would impose an undue hardship on an employer, the court must look not to the gross cost of the accommodation, but rather to its net cost. To the extent that an employer receives tax credits or other benefits for the installation of an accommodation, these must be offset from the accommodation's cost. 15 5 The cost of the accommodation to the employer must be its real cost. The employer must not be allowed to inflate the cost of hiring an employee with a disability by speculating about the possibility of increased workers' compensation liability 156 
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REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA 1451 such costs without evidence that the individual in question is likely to require the cost would allow the employer to refuse to hire an applicant with a disability solely on the unfounded stereotype that workers with disabilities have more accidents than nondisabled workers. 1 5 8 Such an action would clearly constitute discrimination under the ADA. Second, the court must take into account the number of employees, presently and in the future, who will benefit from the proposed accommodation. 1 5 9 An accommodation that might be unreasonable for one employee may not impose an undue hardship if five employees will benefit. By extension, the court should take into account the number of employees, regardless of whether or not they have disabilities, who will derive a significant benefit from a proposed accommodation. The court should not place much weight on this factor, however, since the ADA does not require that an employer provide accommodations for employees who do not have disabilities. Nevertheless, the fact that a large number of employees would derive a significant benefit from a particular accommodation may contribute to the likelihood that the employer will eventually provide the accommodation, regardless of whether it is required by a disabled employee. If an employer would eventually provide the proposed accommodation, but refuses to provide it when it is needed to accommodate an applicant or employee with a disability, the employer should be liable for discrimination, unless changing the timing would itself cause an undue hardship. 160 Third, the court must recognize that when examining the impact of a proposed accommodation on a facility, the concerns are slightly different than they are when examining the impact on the employing entity as a whole. By respondifig to criticism and scaling down the level of the burden of undue hardship, Congress made clear that it did not intend to push employers to the verge of insolvency. Thus, an accommodation may impose an undue hardship without threatening the continued vitality of the enterprise. With regard to a particular facility, however, Congress intended a higher standard. The version of the ADA passed by the Senate did not provide for consideration of the impact. on an individual facility in determining undue hardship; it looked only to the impact on the employer's business as a whole. 162 The House amended this provision because of its concern that an -otherwise thriving enterprise would shut down a marginal facility rather than absorb the cost of the proposed accommodation at that facility. The House Report offered the example of a department store chain operating a store in a rural area at a loss. Because the House did not want to deprive the community of the benefit of having the store, it determined that if the cost of the proposed accommodation would cause the chain to close the store or reduce overall employment at the store, the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
1 6 3
The fact that Congress's concern -was with the continued existence of employment at marginal facilities suggests that, as long as a facility is not threatened with closure or job loss, an accommodation may be relatively costly with regard to the budget for the particular facility if it would not impose an undue hardship on the employing enterprise as a whole.
An analysis of a leading case under section 501 demonstrates the manner in which a court might consider the factors suggested by Congress to arrive at the proper level of accommodation and hardship required by the ADA. In Gardner v. Morris, 164 the plaintiff, a manic-depressive civil employee with the Army Corps of Engineers, sought transfer to a construction project in Saudi Arabia. 165 The plaintiff controlled his illness with lithium carbonate, but there remained a risk that he would suffer a manic episode; in addition, the plaintiff's use of lithium required him to undergo blood tests every three months to detect lithium toxicity. 166 The medical facilities existing at the site in Saudi Arabia were primitive and would not allow blood analysis to be done on-site; there also were no doctors at the site. available to the plaintiff would have been a one-hour flight or thirteen-hour drive away, and travel between the site and the clinic was occasionally disrupted by sandstorms. 167 Under these circumstances, the court held, the defendant was not required to transfer the plaintiff because no reasonable accommodation would ensure his safety and the safety of his co-workers. 168 The court rejected a proposed protocol that would have established procedures for treating the plaintiff in the event that he suffered a manic episode, stating that the lack of on-site facilities and the difficulty of travel to the clinic meant that the protocol would not guarantee the plaintiff's safety. 169 The court further reasoned that the Corps was not required to provide both a physician and on-site laboratory facilities, because the cost of such accommodations would be unreasonable.
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The court's application of section 501 was questionable and has been sharply criticized. 171 Had the case been brought under the ADA and adjudicated according to the principles established by Congress, the court's reasoning would also have been severely flawed. First, the court failed to provide any analysis of the burden that providing improved medical facilities would impose on the Corps as a whole, and on the particular site. 172 The cost of providing such facilities surely would not have imposed an undue hardship on the Corps as a whole, and there was no evidence that the cost of providing the medical facilities would have prevented the project in Saudi Arabia from proceeding. 173 Second, the court failed to take into account the fact that, as the project expanded, the medical facilities at the Saudi site were progressively upgraded. By the spring of 1980, two years after plaintiff's transfer was denied, the need for medical facilities at the site was so great that the Corps had established a 100-bed hospital with laboratory facilities. 174 Thus, the plaintiff was not simply asking that the Corps provide him with his own personal doctor; rather, he was asking the Corps to [Vol. 139:1423 adjust the transition from the early stages of the project, when only a nurse was stationed at the site, to the later stages, when the ability to provide full medical care at the site was needed. Surely the plaintiff would not have been the only worker at the site to benefit from the presence of a doctor and a basic laboratory. To deny reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the court would have had to find both that the proposed accommodation would place an undue burden either on the Corps as a whole or on the Saudi site, and that the burden could not be justified by the fact that the plaintiff would not be alone in benefitting from the accommodation. While the court could have reached such a conclusion on the facts before it, it would have done so through a far more rigorous analysis than it actually applied.
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The standard for undue hardship can be further refined by drawing on the concerns expressed by Congress when defining reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. First, in defining reasonable accommodation, Congress expressed a concern for the employer's overall performance. By specifying that a reasonable accommodation is one that allows an employee with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position, Congress indicated that the employer need not accept a lower standard of performance from its employees who have disabilities.
176 Second, in describing the reason for examining the impact of an accommodation on a facility as well as on the business entity as a whole, Congress stated that it did not intend the Act to require employers either to cease operations or to reduce their workforce.
17 7 In these two portions of the Act, Congress has clearly indicated those burdens that it does not intend to impose on employers. It follows that, under the Act, an accommodation imposes an undue hardship if its cost would either (a) substantially impair the ability of the employer to produce goods or provide services, or (b) impose such a high cost that the This proposed test is consistent with the boundaries set on reasonable accommodation by Congress. It would impose a lower threshold of undue hardship than the so-called "bankruptcy" provision that Congress rejected early in its consideration of the Act, yet the test would require employers to absorb more than a de minimis cost. 179 Moreover, it is consistent with the notion that a large employer should be able to absorb a higher cost of accommodation than a small employer. One case brought under section 504, Nelson v. Thornburgh, 1 80 illustrates this relationship. In Nelson, the court required the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare to hire readers for three blind income maintenance workers who, with the accommodation, were able to perform their jobs as well as their sighted co-workers.
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The court estimated the annual cost of providing a reader for four hours a day at roughly $6638.182 The court then compared that cost with the department's $300 million administrative budget, and concluded that the cost was not unreasonable.
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The court further noted that the accommodation could be adopted "without any disruption of DPW's services.
" 184 The court thus concluded that the accommodation would not, under the circumstances, impose an undue hardship. 1 8 5 Had the employer been a neighborhood clinic with a four-digit budget, rather than a nine-digit budget, it is unlikely that the court would have reached the same result; the required accommodation would have threatened the clinic's ability to provide services. A strict definition of undue hardship that would provide a clearcut answer in every situation is not possible, because of the range 178 Although arrived at by different means, this test is similar to the integrity of the program test set forth in Note, supra note 106, at 1415, 1434. Cf Tucker, supra note 14, at 896 ("In sum, the 'fundamental alteration' or 'substantial modification' test should be defined as requiring that the accommodation at issue would 'sacrifice the integrity' of the job or program."); Note, supra note 29, at 900 ("To justify not accommodating handicapped persons who show they can benefit from the program, a recipient must demonstrate that implementing the affirmative steps would severely impair a program's services.").
79 See supra text preceding and following note 154. [Vol. 139:1423 of possible accommodations and the variances in employer resources. To ensure that employers meet the obligations imposed by the ADA, it is essential that courts carefully scrutinize claims that a particular accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
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In particular, the court must recognize that a mere loss in efficiency is not the equivalent under the ADA of impaired ability to provide services or produce goods. Although the ADA requires that individuals with disabilities be as capable of performing the essential functions of theirjobs as nondisabled employees, the ADA expressly contemplates, in its reasonable accommodation requirement, that an equivalent level of performance may come at a higher cost to the employer. For example, Congress, like the Nelson court, recognized that in some circumstances, providing a reader for a blind employee may be a reasonable accommodation. 18 7 The employer will not be required to provide the reader if doing so does not allow the blind employee to achieve a productivity comparable to that of sighted employees. 18 8 But the accommodation would not cause an undue hardship merely because, to obtain a comparable level of performance, the employer will have to pay wages to both the blind employee and the reader, rather than to a single sighted employee. To assert a defense of undue hardship, the employer must show more than increased costs of production; it must show that the increased costs threaten its ability to maintain its current level of output or its current workforce.
Ill. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE ADA
A. The Employer's Duty of Individual Consideration
The ADA's requirement of reasonable accommodation is the key to breaking down the walls of myth and ignorance that have limited opportunities for individuals with disabilities. By imposing the duty of reasonable accommodation, Congress hoped to force employers to overcome their preconceived notions about disabilities and focus the safety of its employees, it may not rely on generalizations or stereotypes in order to protect that interest.
B. Burdens of Proof
Congress has specified that the burden of proof under the ADA is to be allocated in a manner consistent with the cases interpreting the section 504 regulations.
225
This statement, unfortunately, provides little guidance. There is general agreement that a section 504 plaintiff may establish a primafadie case by showing that (1) she was an individual with a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, (2) she was otherwise qualified for the position sought, and (3) she was excluded solely because of her handicap. 226 Once the plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the plaintiff was not otherwise qualified-in other words, that no reasonable accommodation was possible-or that any possible accommodation would cause the defendant undue hardship. There is, however, considerable room for disagreement about the amount and quality of evidence that the plaintiff must present to establish the prima facie case. There is also room for disagreement about the nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant, once the prima facie case has been established.
The disputes center chiefly on the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that she is otherwise qualified. There are three possible interpretations of the phrase "otherwise qualified." The first model, articulated by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 227 requires the plaintiff to establish that she was able to meet all of the employer's requirements in spite of her disability. The second model, unlike the first, explicitly recognizes the element of accommodation, but, like the first, places the burden of persuasion squarely on the plaintiff. Under this model, the plaintiff not only must demonstrate that she met all of the employer's requirements not related to her disability, but must also introduce evidence sufficient to prove that the employer could have reasonably accommodated her as to those requirements that her disability prevented her from meeting. The third model requires the plaintiff to carry the burden of persuasion on the issue of whether she can meet all of the employer's standards on which her disability has no impact. If there are standards that she cannot meet because of her disability, the plaintiff must meet the burden of production on the issue of whether the employer could have reasonably accommodated her. The defendant would then have the burden of persuasion to show that no reasonable accommodation was possible.
Of the three models, the first is clearly inappropriate for the ADA. Its requirement may be read in two ways. The first, accepting the words of the mode at face value, would read the requirement of reasonable accommodation out of the Act. The second, while acknowledging the requirement of accommodation, collapses the separate inquiries of whether the plaintiff's inability to meet the employer's standards was related to the limitations imposed by her disability-if it was not, then the employer is under no obligation to offer accommodation 22 8 -and whether the barrier that her disability created could have been overcome by reasonable accommodation. The first model thus would only lead to conceptual confusion, and should be rejected by courts applying the ADA. The second model, which has been adopted rather casually by several courts, 229 has more to recommend it. The element of reasonable accommodation is presented in the statute not as a defense but as part of the definition of discrimination.
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Thus, this model has the conceptual virtue of requiring the plaintiff to carry the burden of persuasion on all the elements constituting 228 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 485, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 65, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 347 (stating as an example that a law firm that requires incoming attorneys to have graduated from an accredited law school and to have passed a bar need not offer an accommodation to an individual with a visual impairment who does not meet these requirements).
See, e.g., Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of whether he was otherwise qualified).
